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negative Enterobacteriaceae with resistance to carbape-
nems conferred by New Delhi metallo-b-lactamase
(NDM-1) are increasingly recognized as a global public
health issue.1e8 The World Health Organization (WHO) has
chosen antimicrobial resistance as its theme for World
Health Dayd7 April 2011.9 The organization strongly
recommends that governments focus control and
prevention efforts in four main areas including surveil-
lance of antimicrobial resistance; rational antibiotic use,
which includes educating health care workers and the
public about the appropriate use of antibiotics; intro-
ducing or enforcing legislation related to stopping the
selling of antibiotics without prescription; and strict
adherence to infection prevention and control measures,
including the use of hand-washing measures, particularly
in health care facilities to limit the spread of multi-drug
resistant strains and reduce the generation of antibiotic-
resistant bacteria.10e15* Corresponding author. Centers for Disease Control, Department of He
Taiwan 10050, ROC.
E-mail address: fychang@cdc.gov.tw (F.-Y. Chang).
1684-1182/$36 Copyright ª 2011, Taiwan Society of Microbiology. Publ
doi:10.1016/j.jmii.2011.03.001Antimicrobial resistance and its global spread
A surveillance study published by the European Centre for
Disease Prevention and Control in 200916 demonstrated
that approximately 400,000 patients from 28 European
countries suffered from infections because of strains of
antibiotic-resistant bacteria, with Escherichia coli and
Klebsiella pneumoniae being the most common causative
pathogens.17,18 The proportion of third-generation cepha-
losporin-resistant E coli increased significantly from 1.7% in
2002 to 8% in 2009, whereas the proportion of E coli
isolates with resistance to four classes of antimicrobials
increased more than 5-fold from 0.6% in 2002 to 3.4% in
2009.16 The increase in antibiotic resistance among
K pneumoniae is even more dire. The European Centre for
Disease Prevention and Control reported that the rate of
resistance of K pneumoniae to powerful and last-line
antibiotics, namely carbapenems, increased from less than
1% to more than 25% in the European Union, 2009.17alth, 9F, No. 6, Linsen South Road, Zhongzheng District, Taipei City,
ished by Elsevier Taiwan LLC. All rights reserved.
158 S.-H. Tseng et al.The prevalence of MDROs in hospitals and medical
centers in the USA has also increased steadily during the
previous decade.19e23 For example, the prevalence of
imipenem-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii infection
increased from 4.8% in 2000 to 21% in 2009, and the prev-
alence of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA) increased from 19% in 2000 to 51.5% in 2009. The
rate of resistance of E coli to trimethoprim-sulfamethox-
azole increased from 17.4% in 2000 to 23.9% in 2009, and
that of E coli to fluoroquinolones rose from 3.3% in 2000 to
17.8% in 2009.24 Furthermore, the prevalence of vancomy-
cin-resistant enterococci (VRE) isolates has also increased
markedly.19,25 For example, VRE isolates accounted for 25%
and 28.5% of all nosocomial infections in intensive care
units (ICUs) in 1999 and 2003 respectively.19,26,27
Antimicrobial resistance is also a threat and challenge to
the treatment of infectious diseases in Taiwan.28,29 The
Taiwan Nosocomial Infection Surveillance system, 2009,
a nationwide surveillance study on the incidence and preva-
lence of antimicrobial resistance in Taiwan during the period
2003e2009, reported that the proportion of MRSA in ICUs in
medical centers and regional hospitals decreased signifi-
cantly (p Z 0.001) from 89.3% in 2003 to 78.0% in 2009
(Fig. 1A); the proportion of VRE in ICUs increased significantly
(pZ 0.001) from 3.7% in 2003 to 19.1% in 2009 (Fig. 1B); andFigure 1. Annual trends in the rates of methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus (A) and vancomycin-resistant entero-
cocci (B) in intensive care units of medical centers and regional
hospitals in Taiwan. Data from the Taiwan Nosocomial Infection
Surveillance system, 2003e2009.the proportion of E coli isolates resistant to carbapenems
(imipenem or menorpenem or ertapenem) in ICUs in medical
centers and regional hospitals increased (p Z 0.231) from
0.5% in 2003 to 2.6% in 2009 (Fig. 2A). The study also showed
that the proportion of K pneumoniae isolates resistant to
carbapenems in ICUs in medical centers and regional hospi-
tals increased significantly (pZ 0.001) from 1.2% in 2003 to
6.0% in 2009 (Fig. 2B); that the proportion of Enter-
obacteriaceae isolates resistant to carbapenems (CRE)
increased significantly (pZ 0.017) from 1.4% in 2003 to 4.5%
in 2009 (Fig. 2C); and that the proportion of A baumannii
isolates resistant to imipenem or menorpenem in ICUs in
medical centers and regional hospitals increased significantly
(p < 0.001) from 18.0% in 2003 to 63.5% in 2009 (Fig. 2D).
Furthermore, the study also found that the proportion of
Pseudomonas aeruginosa isolates resistant to imipenem or
menorpenem in ICUs in medical centers and regional hospi-
tals remained stable (15%) during the study period.
Risk factors for antibiotics resistance
Several factors may lead to the increase in antimicrobial
resistance, such as hospital stay before ICU admission,
hospitalization period before ICU admission, length of ICU
stay, surgical ICU stay, the type of operation, previous antibi-
otic use, inappropriate use of antimicrobial drugs,19,3035 and
inadequate adherence to infection control practices.19e48
In particular, some patients are more vulnerable to coloni-
zation and infections including those with severe disease,
thosewith compromised host defenses because of underlying
medical conditions, patients with recent surgery, and those
with indwelling medical devices. Furthermore, hospitalized
patients are likely to have more risk factors and higher
infection rates than non-hospitalized patients, especially
those who require treatment in the ICU.32,49e52
Akinci et al.53 demonstrated that patients with infec-
tions because of imipenem-resistant (IR) gram-negative
bacteria have longer lengths of stay in ICUs compared with
patients infected with imipenem-susceptible isolates.
Furthermore, they found that the risk of IR gram-negative
bacteria infection was four times higher for patients who
undergo surgery and 3-fold higher for patients on carba-
penem therapy. According to Kim et al. in Korea, the
presence of neutropenia and the prolonged use of cepha-
losporin (more than 7 days) were more common among
patients with bacteremia caused by IR isolates than among
patients with bacteremia caused by imipenem-susceptible
isolates (odds ratio 3.03 and 3.82, respectively).54 They also
confirmed that neutropenia and prolonged cephalosporin
use (more than 7 days) were independent risk factors for
metallo-b-lactamase-producing Acinetobacter bacteremia
(odds ratio 22.10 and 19.57, respectively).
Impact of antibiotic resistance
Antimicrobial-resistant pathogens that cause health care-
associated infections (HAIs) are becoming increasingly
common. Studies have shown an association between the
development of multi-drug resistance and increases in
mortality, lengths of hospital stay, and cost of health
care.19,55e60
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Figure 2. Annual trends in the rates of carbapenem-resistant Escherichia coli (A), carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella pneumoniae
(B), carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (C) and carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii (D) in intensive care units
of medical centers and regional hospitals in Taiwan. Data from the Taiwan Nosocomial Infection Surveillance system, 2003e2009.
Emergence and spread of multi-drug resistant 159Comparisons of mortality rate, length of stay in hospi-
tals, and health care costs between patients with methi-
cillin-susceptible S aureus (MSSA) bacteremia and those
with MRSA bacteremia have shown that patients with
MRSA bacteremia have a significantly higher rate of
mortality, markedly longer lengths of hospital stay, and
higher median hospital costs than patients with MSSA
bacteremia.61e63 Furthermore, surgical site infections
caused by MRSA were shown to be associated with a 3.4-
fold higher risk for death and a 2-fold increase in median
hospital costs than surgical site infections caused by MSSA
infections. According to Blot et al. in Belgium,64 patients
with MRSA bacteremia had a higher 30-day mortality rate
than patients with MSSA bacteremia (53.2% vs. 18.4%,
p < 0.05) and a higher in-hospital mortality rate (63.8% vs.
23.7%, p < 0.05).Taiwan CDC strategies for confronting
antimicrobial resistance
Prevention of antimicrobial resistance depends on appro-
priate clinical practices that should be incorporated into all
routine patient care. The Taiwan Centers for Disease
Control (Taiwan CDC) takes a multifaceted, evidence-based
approach in accordance with WHO’s strategies in four main
areas.411. Surveillance of antimicrobial resistance41
1.1 Establishment of the Taiwan nosocomial infection
and antimicrobial resistance surveillance system
(Fig. 3): This system focuses on the monitoring of
HAI and antimicrobial resistance.
1.2 To establish a national Communicable Disease
Reporting System for laboratories in Taiwan. Multi-
drug resistant bacteria including S aureus isolates
with reduced susceptibility to vancomycin (vanco-
mycin-intermediate or resistant S aureus) and
carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae identified
by the clinical laboratories will be confirmed by
national reference laboratory affiliated in the
Communicable Disease Reporting System.
1.3 To conduct a project on “the status of multi-drug
resistance, antimicrobial resistance mechanisms, and
infection control measures of Enterobacteriaceae in
Taiwan”.
1.4 To monitor the trend and spatial distribution of
antimicrobial-resistant bacterial strains by imple-
menting the National Collection and Confirmation
of Antimicrobial Resistance program. The program
will develop a database of antimicrobial-resistant
bacteria including carbapenem-resistant Enter-
obacteriaceae, VRE isolates, and MRSA strains with
vancomycin minimum inhibition concentration
values 2 mg/mL.
Figure 3. Taiwan Nosocomial Infection and Antimicrobial
Resistance Surveillance System. CDC Z Centers for Disease
Control; HIS Z Hospital Information System; TNIS Z Taiwan
Nosocomial Infection Surveillance.
160 S.-H. Tseng et al.2. Rational antibiotic use, including educating health care
workers and the public about the appropriate use of
antibiotics41,65,66
2.1 To establish regulations for antibiotic usage. This
will be accomplished through hospital accreditation
and infection control inspection mechanisms to help
hospitals develop and effectively implement control
strategies for antibiotics.
2.2 To establish guidance through collaboration with
experts, academic organizations, and societies.
2.2.1 Regulation of national health insurance
payment such as declaring “Directions for
Drug-Restricted Benefits for National Health
Insurance” will be set and updated through
collaboration with medical institutions,
research institutions, drug supplements, and
experts.
2.2.2 Antimicrobial usage for upper respiratory
tract infections has been restricted since
2001. The costs of antimicrobial agents used
in the treatment of ambulatory patients with
acute upper respiratory tract infections
without evidence of bacterial involvement are
not reimbursed.
2.2.3 Regulations for the use of prophylactic anti-
biotics, which focus on reducing overuse of
prophylactic antibiotics during clean and
clean-contaminated procedures, were imple-
mented beginning in 2001. Observance of
these regulations is included in hospital
accreditation and infection control inspection
criteria.
2.2.4 Continue working with related institutions and
academic groups and societies and updating
the guidelines of “appropriate use of antibi-
otics” and “special antibiotic use”. Antibiotic-
prescribing guidelines for physicians will be
developed.2.3 To enhance education of appropriate antibiotic use
and antimicrobial resistance for medical students
and medical staff
2.3.1 To implement relevant online learning and
training of prudent use of antibiotics for
health care workers.
2.3.2 Infection control will be included in a manda-
tory 40-hour generalmedicine training programs
after graduation.
2.3.3 All physicians will be subject to a certain level
of continuing education, including courses on
infection control, every 6 years.
2.3.4 Implementation of “infection control, proper
use of antibiotics, and implementation of
education and monitoring mechanisms” will
be added to the infection control course to
improve the quality of medical care.
Furthermore, promotional materials will be
distributed to enhance education and training
for basic medical and non-medical staff.
2.4 To enhance knowledge of antibiotics, antimicrobial
resistance, and sensitivity tests among staff in
microbiological laboratories. The National Health
Research Institutes will conduct related workshops
each year to discuss current use of antibiotics,
evolution of drug resistance, hospital and commu-
nity transmission, and drug-resistant strains.
2.5 To enhance the understanding of antibiotics among
the general population, and promote the “5 basic
principles” concept: do not listen, do not trust, do
not purchase, do not take, and do not recommend.
3. Introducing or enforcing legislation related to stopping
the selling of antibiotics without prescription67
3.1 Local health authorities will supervise pharmacies
that sell antibiotics with a prescription.
3.2 Drug investigations and pharmaceutical-related
regulations will be included to enrich and strengthen
the knowledge and investigative ability of health
officers when conducting national pharmaceutical
seminars.
3.3 Notify all pharmacies to maintain self-discipline and
not to sell antibiotic agents to the public without
prescription.
3.4 Continue to promote medicine-pharmacy separa-
tion, and strengthen professional service of commu-
nity pharmacies such as providing the public with
correct medication advice.
3.5 Production, marketing and stocks will be listed as
check points when follow and investigate domestic
antibiotic factories.
3.6 To counsel and strengthen medical related indus-
tries and increase the knowledge of drug use among
the public.
4. Strict adherence to infection prevention and control
measures, including the use of hand hygiene measures,
particularly in health care facilities41,65,66
Reinforce infection control capacity in hospital/
medical institutions: continue to make improvements
in hand hygiene measures, environmental cleaning,
contact protection, standard operating procedures
related to the handling of invasive equipment and other
infection control measures.
Emergence and spread of multi-drug resistant 1614.1 Continue to promote the WHO “hand hygiene”
campaign. Enforce hand hygiene by promoting hand
hygiene as an integral part of patient safety, and by
evaluating performance indicators regularly to
encourage hospitals to improve continually. The
three strategies of implementation include inter-
vention, financial incentives, and performance.
Promotion of hand hygiene among health care
workers will comprise dividing hospitals into
different groups according to the hospital level;
rewarding participating hospitals for installing hand
hygiene facilities; and encouraging hospitals to
undertake system changes in hand hygiene measures
and establishing demonstration centers for hand
hygiene. Our goals are: (1) to promote the use of
alcohol-based handrubs, increase the accessibility of
hand hygiene facilities, and establish hand hygiene
facilities at each point of care; (2) to raise health
care workers’ recognition in five moments for hand
hygiene approach. This approach recommends health
care workers to clean their hands before touching
a patient, before clean/aseptic procedures, after
body fluid exposure/risk, after touching a patient,
and after touching patient surroundings; and (3) to
diminish the rate of HAI and reduce costs for health
care resources.
4.2 To conduct a project entitled “the integrated bundle
to lower catheter-related bloodstream infections”.
4.3 To establish infection control guidelines for moni-
toring, allocating, and isolating multi-drug resistant
strains as well as caring for patients with infections
because of MDROs by reviewing relevant studies
in the medical literature, and by consulting the
advisory committee and infectious disease control“National Infectious Disease 
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Figure 4. National Infectious Disease Prevention and Conexperts. The Department of Health needs to
consider various views from medical practice units
and institutions. After reviewing various points,
infection control guidelines will be announced in
each health care setting for reference and modifi-
cation of standard procedures.
4.4 To establish a national infection control network
(Fig. 4). The Taiwan CDC divides Taiwan into six
regions. Every region has a command center to help
prevent and control infectious diseases in each
region. The Taiwan CDC has also established a robust
infection control framework in health care
settings: this includes the supervision of establishing
a hospital infection control committee and the
assignment of physicians and nurses responsible for
implementing and promoting infection control.NDM-1 Enterobacteriaceae in Taiwan
According to the Communicable Disease Control Act and to
require medical institutes and personnel to report such
cases and offer a basis for implementing control measures
for public health issues, the Taiwan CDC decided to include
NDM-1 Enterobacteriaceae infection as a Category IV Noti-
fiable Infectious Disease on September 9, 2010.68
Although no confirmed cases of NDM-1 Enter-
obacteriaceae infection had been identified in Taiwan at
that time, clinicians were, nonetheless, required to report
NDM-1 Enterobacteriaceae infection within 24 hours of
diagnosis to the Taiwan CDC Notifiable Infectious Disease
Reporting System (Fig. 5) to prevent subsequent spread.
The Taiwan CDC Notifiable Infectious Disease Reporting
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162 S.-H. Tseng et al.and case determination. The definition of the following
cases should be used to report confirmed cases of NDM-1
Enterobacteriaceae:
1. Clinical characteristics (an illness that has one of the
following characteristics):
1.1 Presence of infection, especially in patients who
have had medical treatment, including invasive and
surgical procedures.
1.2 Suspected cases of NDM-1 Enterobacteriaceae.
2. Epidemiological characteristics (an illness that has any
one of the following characteristics):
2.1 Patients who had traveled abroad during the past 6
months, especially those with medical history.
2.2 Patients who have not had hospital treatment
overseas, but have had contact with suspected
cases of NDM-1 Enterobacteriaceae when receiving
hospital treatment.
3. Laboratory characteristics: Detection of CRE isolates
recovered from the patient’s specimen.
4. Case definition: A case that meets the abovementioned
clinical, epidemiological and laboratory characteristics.
5. Clinicians must file a report on the cases that meet the
aforementioned characteristics within 24 hours of diag-
nosis. Specimens from the patients must also be
collected and submitted to the Taiwan CDC for final
identification. Clinicians are also welcome to report
cases that meet only the clinical and epidemiological
characteristics but that could not be verified for drug
resistance to the health authorities.
The Taiwan CDC confirmed the first case of NDM-1
Enterobacteriaceae infection in Taiwan on January 14,
2011.69 The isolate was confirmed to be NDM-1 Klebsiella
oxytoca. In accordance with the Communicable Disease
Control Act, the hospital reported the case to the health
authority on January 10, 2011. The hospital has been
implementing all relevant infection control measures
according to standard operating procedures of the Taiwan
CDC for reporting NDM-1 Enterobacteriaceae infection
(Fig. 6). The abovementioned case has been receiving
medical treatment in a single room since his admission to
the hospital. During the period October to December, 2010,this was the only case among 81 isolates of CRE that tested
positive for NDM-1 in the hospital. So far, there is no
evidence of nosocomial infection involving NDM-1 Enter-
obacteriaceae in that hospital. In Taiwan, the CDC, major
medical centers, and research institutes have collected
a total of 1,000 CRE strains and none of them were NDM-
1-positive Enterobacteriaceae. Consequently, the case is
suspected to be an imported case but more information will
be collected and studied to confirm that hypothesis.
To combat antimicrobial resistance and its global spread,
the Taiwan CDC continuously works on control measures
based on WHO’s recommendations such as coordinating the
implementation of hospital accreditation associated infec-
tion control inspection programs, boosting the quality of the
infection control inspection programs, and giving advice or
sharing experience on infection control practices through
on-site audits to improve the performance of infection
control programs in health care settings. The CDC has also
established the Taiwan Nosocomial Infection and Antimi-
crobial Resistance Surveillance system for gathering and
documenting surveillance data on the occurrence of HAIs
and the status of antimicrobial resistance nationwide. To
date, the system is used by 100% of medical centers and over
90% of the regional hospitals in Taiwan.
In addition to the four-point framework for planning and
implementing relative approaches, the Taiwan CDC will
also promote the implementation of hospital infection
control measures at a reasonable operating cost. Together
with the medical payment system, these measures will
leverage hospitals’ motives. Effective infection control can
prevent at least 20% of HAIs. Hence, medical resources can
be saved if the occurrence of HAIs is prevented. However,
some determinants may influence the effectiveness of
infection control measures such as allocation and training
of clinical human resources; the availability of equipment,
supplies, and hospital hardware; ward allocation of infec-
ted patients; management support, and investment. The
above determinants are related to funding allocation. To
reduce the problem caused by antimicrobial resistance, the
medical payment system needs to be combined. This
includes the rationalization and enhancement of the
national health insurance system. The performance and
assessment of health care settings’ infection control will be
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Figure 6. Standard operating procedure for reporting NDM-1 Enterobacteriaceae infection in Taiwan. CRE Z carbapenem-
resistant Enterobacteriaceae; NDM-1 Z New Delhi metallo-b-lactamase.
Emergence and spread of multi-drug resistant 163based on peer ratings. As a result, this might provide
appropriate care to those affected by microbes and protect
patients’ rights. Multi-drug resistant bacteria are not new
and will continue to appear. Therefore, the Taiwan CDC
will make every effort to combat antimicrobial resistance
by targeting consumers, prescribers and dispensers, veter-
inarians, managers of hospitals and diagnostic laboratories,
patients and visitors to health care facilities, as well as
national governments, the pharmaceutical industry,
professional societies, and international agencies.
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